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Abstract
Despite remarkable empirical and methodological advances, our theoretical understanding of the evolutionary processes 
that made us human remains fragmented and contentious. Here, we make the radical proposition that the cultural communi-
ties within which Homo emerged may be understood as a novel exotic form of organism. The argument begins from a deep 
congruence between robust features of Pan community life cycles and protocell models of the origins of life. We argue that 
if a cultural tradition, meeting certain requirements, arises in the context of such a “social protocell,” the outcome will be 
an evolutionary transition in individuality whereby traditions and hominins coalesce into a macroscopic bio-socio-technical 
system, with an organismal organization that is culturally inherited through irreversible fission events on the community 
level. We refer to the resulting hypothetical evolutionary individual as a “sociont.” The social protocell provides a preadapted 
source of alignment of fitness interests that addresses a number of open questions about the origins of shared adaptive cultural 
organization, and the derived genetic (and highly unusual) adaptations that support them. Also, social cooperation between 
hominins is no longer in exclusive focus since cooperation among traditions becomes salient in this model. This provides 
novel avenues for explanation. We go on to hypothesize that the fate of the hominin in such a setting would be mutualistic 
coadaptation into a part-whole relation with the sociont, and we propose that the unusual suite of derived features in Homo 
is consistent with this hypothesis.
Keywords Cooperation · Cultural evolution · Cultural group selection · Evolutionary transitions in individuality · Human 
evolution · Macroevolutionary theory · Social protocell · Sociont
Introduction
An improving empirical picture of hominin evolution is cre-
ating a growing theoretical challenge, namely that of piecing 
together fragments of insight from a wide variety of disci-
plines, methodologies, and contexts into coherent explana-
tions—the stories of our deep prehistory. What we seem to 
observe is a perfect storm of contingent factors and powerful 
feedback processes that generated an evolutionary episode 
that biological theory sorely under-describes (e.g., Anders-
son et al. 2014; Foley 2016; Fuentes 2016; Whiten et al. 
2017). Hominin evolution is thereby turning out to demand 
dedicated and spirited theoretical development. As Maslin 
et al. (2015) put it, we must create new “meta-narratives”—
new stories about how to tell stories.
In this spirit, we develop here a proposition about what 
fundamental type of macroevolutionary trajectory we are 
looking at. We propose that human evolution is best under-
stood as an evolutionary transition in individuality (ETI; 
e.g., Michod 2007; Leigh 2010; Hanschen et al. 2015) that 
combines evolutionary patterns familiar from earlier ETI but 
in a radically new type of substrate.
Key to this new theoretical proposition is the argument 
that the basic kinetics of early hominin communities closely 
parallels protocell models of the origin of cellular life: inci-
dentally preadapted chemical vesicles that compartmental-
ized autocatalytic reaction networks, producing macrolevel 
evolutionary populations (Gánti 1975, 1997; Hanczyc and 
Szostak 2004; Rasmussen et al. 2004; Filisetti et al. 2010; 
Serra and Villani 2017). We argue that hominin communi-
ties were preadapted to act (under the right set of ecological 
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circumstances) as “social protocells” with regard to heritable 
cultural traditions and hominins.
The social protocell model paints a “culture first” sce-
nario where the hallmark deep cooperativity and cumulative 
culture of Homo originated from mutualistic cooperation 
between simple atomistic cultural traditions (similar to those 
observed in Pan today). Homo here emerges as the outcome 
of mutualistic evolution, as a component of the increas-
ingly organismal organization of the novel type of macro-
scopic and bio-socio-technical evolutionary individual (EI; 
Lewontin 1970; Sober and Wilson 1994; Maynard-Smith 
and Szathmáry 1995; Queller 2000; Michod and Roze 2001) 
that coalesced within the social protocell. We refer to this 
emergent EI as a “sociont.”
By making this theoretical connection, our hypothesis 
takes a macroevolutionary perspective on human origins 
(see also Szathmary 2015 and Foley 2016) that, we hold, 
has the potential to organize the interpretation of empiri-
cal evidence and serve as an enveloping theoretical meta-
narrative. We see human evolution as fundamentally about 
the emergence of evolution on a new level of organization, 
and the evolution of a new set of basic evolutionary mecha-
nisms for heredity, storage, development, and organization. 
This calls for a shift from “normal evolution” to “transitional 
evolution” in a new meta-narrative about human evolution 
(see also Foley 2016).
We also thereby move in the direction of unifying human 
evolution with the larger issue of major evolutionary transi-
tions in natural history (MET). The dramatic evolutionary, 
ecological, and environmental impact of the advent of Homo 
hereby falls more squarely into the larger natural historical 
pattern of dramatic evolutionary disruptions resulting from 
bouts of innovation on this fundamental level (e.g., May-
nard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Calcott and Sterelny 2011; 
Andersson et al. 2014; Erwin 2015; Szathmáry 2015; West 
et al. 2015; O’Malley and Powell 2016).1
The proposed hominin ETI would have begun in early 
Homo communities ca. 2.6 mya, with large game carnivory, 
we argue, as the kernel around which the initial mutual-
istic system of traditions coalesced. The dramatic range 
expansion across the Old World that took place ca. 1.8 mya 
(Fleagle et al. 2010; Antón et al. 2014; Foley 2016) sig-
nals that the ETI had settled into a functioning new evo-
lutionary machinery capable of macroscopic adaptation in 
previously unseen ways. The equally dramatic and unusual 
physiological change that followed in Homo (e.g., Antón and 
Snodgrass 2012), as well as the increasing organizational 
complexity of Homo societies, we see as evidence of a shift 
from micro- (hominin) to macrolevel (community) selection, 
and to a mutualistic evolutionary trajectory between the 
hominin organism and the exotic sociont host organism that 
coalesced around it.
We first introduce the social protocell model of the homi-
nin ETI, in the following section. The resulting community-
level EI would then harden into a sociont with an internal 
bio-socio-technical organization—selected and cumulatively 
adapted on the macrolevel into an organismal organization 
(the third section). With the term early hominins, we are 
referring to Australopithecus forms, some of which were 
ancestral to Homo (before ca. 3.0 mya). By early Homo, we 
intend pre-erectus forms (e.g., H. habilis; ca. 3.0–1.8 mya).
The Hominin ETI
The community-to-sociont ETI model has two main 
components:
(1) The “social protocell” (see “The Social Protocell as a 
Preadapation” section and Fig. 1a–c).
(2) The right kind of cultural tradition for setting off the 
ETI (see “The IGUT ” section and Fig. 1d).
We picture the primordial situation (pre-Oldowan; >2.6 
mya) as similar in outline to what we see among present-
day Pan, with the “social protocell” arising as a side effect 
of social group dynamics, containing a “primordial soup” 
of appearing and disappearing cultural traditions. The key 
cultural tradition would arise from this creative variability, 
but only under specific ecological circumstances.
The outcome, we argue, was a macroscopic evolution-
ary population of group-selected communities—socionts—
that seamlessly combined and integrated biological, social, 
and technical components. The socionts were evolutionary 
individuals (EI) exhibiting phenotypic variation, differen-
tial fitness, and heritable fitness (Lewontin 1970; Sober and 
Wilson 1994; Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Michod 
and Roze 2001; Godfrey-Smith 2007).
By referring to this hypothetical type of EI as socionta 
we simultaneously differentiate and indicate continuity 
with bionta (a defunct taxon denoting all living things). 
We thereby also differentiate the post-ETI community from 
precursor communities, where lower forms of nonkin coop-
eration may be adequately understood in simpler evolution-
ary terms as the outcome of robust individual benefits (e.g., 
Dugatkin 1997, 2002; Clutton-Brock 2009).
The Social Protocell as a Preadaptation
We begin by describing the protocell model in its origi-
nal context, moving then to its reapplication to hominin 
evolution.
1 Earlier examples include the origins of life, eukaryotes, and multi-
cellularity.
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B - Grow-divide lifecycle
As communities grow (1), social 
networks destabilize and partition 
roughly symmetrically (2), eventually 
splitting (3) – ready to repeat the cycle. 
C - “The social protocell”
The “protocell” combines features 
described in A and B. A community (1)
is impermeable to culture and controls 
the passage of hominins. On the inside 
(2) fitness interests are aligned: cultural 
traditions are inherited together as a 
bundle regardless of whether they 
interact or not. This provides a strong 
potential for cooperation between 
cultural traditions and in the end 
hominins, and the emergence of 
complex adaptive organization on the 
macrolevel.  
A - Vertical channeling
Interaction is strong, frequent, and 
individualized within but not between
communities (1). This structures 
cultural transmission within 
communities (2) and strongly limits 
the spread of culture between
communities.  
D – ETI and an evolutionary 
population
The key event was when the social 
protocell finally came to channel a 
cultural tradition with strong impact on 
fitness – which Pan traditions do not 
have – and where increasing investment 
in complex and cooperative strategies 
paid off.  
Microlevel success and failure was then 
strongly reflected in macrolevel failure 
and success; sabotaged cooperation 
would swiftly increase collective risk 
from competing neighbors to which 
defection was impossible (for hominins 
and cultural traditions.) The community 
turns into an Evolutionary Individual – 
the sociont.
At right we see a hypothetical sociont 
population competing over territory. 
Green socionts (1) represent adaptive 
novelty (cultural or genetic), providing 
higher relative growth-and-division 
rates. A few divisions have taken place, 
and outward pressure is applied on 
socionts lacking the beneficial variant 
(2). One sociont is at the brink of 
collapse (3).   
E – Adaptive Functional 
Organization – an organism
The sociont organism undergoes 
adaptation by the adaptive functional 
organization of its internal 
bio-socio-technical system.  
Microscopic adaptations as components 
in larger functional systems are 
diagnostic of ETI. For example, lithic 
raw material provision makes no sense 
without the economy of production, 
curation, storage, and use of lithic tools. 
Likewise, language has little point in the 
lone (or first) speaker. Homo
communities are replete with evidence 
of such features. Homo physiology 
generally declines in external ecological 
specialization toward modern Homo 
sapiens while heavy investment in 
internally motivated adaptations 
increases: large brain, prosociality, 
executive functions, etc.
F – The endosymbiotic ape?
Individually reproducing organisms 
that become obligate mutualistic 
symbionts of their hosts are referred to 
as endosymbionts. This appears to be 
the model that best describes the type 
of ecological context in which Homo
evolved – both in terms of the actual 
systemic context of Homo and in terms 
of actual physiological outcomes, not 
least with regard to the size of the 
brain.
1 2
3
2
1
1
2
1
2 3
Fig. 1  Overview of the hominin ETI model
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Protocells and the Origins of New Channels of Inheritance
The backbone of biological cell interfaces is a phospholipid 
bilayer membrane. Significantly for explaining the plausible 
emergence of cellular life, eminently nonliving phospholipid 
vesicles grow and divide under reasonably lax assumptions 
(Hanczyk and Szostak 2004). Simply put, (1) if an auto-
catalytic metabolic process contained within such a vesicle 
produces phospholipid molecules as a by-product, these will 
spontaneously become incorporated into the enclosing mem-
brane, causing it to grow. (2) If the vesicle grows too large it 
will spontaneously undergo fission, resulting in two smaller 
vesicles (e.g., Filisetti et al. 2010; Terasawa et al. 2012).
The resulting smaller vesicles (which are impermeable to 
the internal reaction networks) will contain whatever chemi-
cal processes the original vesicle contained, so the daughter 
vesicles will exhibit inheritance of the properties of the par-
ent vesicle (Gánti 1975, 1997).
If the reactions within populations of such vesicles exhibit 
heritable variation in efficiency, stability, and so on, then 
vesicle growth and fission rate would be variable and subject 
to natural selection. They would have fitness. A Darwinian 
evolutionary exploration of the available cell-level design 
space would result: fitness would immediately be transferred 
from the chemical reaction networks to their collective per-
formance on the macroscopic cellular level.
In this “fission–fusion” model for the origins of life (Nor-
ris and Raine 1998) one may say that portions of a “primor-
dial soup” get “canned” within a structure that just happens 
to exhibit suitable macrolevel kinetic properties. The struc-
ture did not emerge because it had these properties, but is 
explained as a chemical phenomenon, which is crucial since 
it means that we do not have to invoke the processes we seek 
to explain. Compartmentalization furthermore stabilizes 
the chemical environment, keeping reactants together, and 
eventually permits the formation of adaptable, organized, 
and homeostatic inner environments (Maynard-Smith and 
Szathmáry 1995, pp. 20–23, 52–57, 99–107; Gánti 1997).
Community Lifecycle and “The Social Protocell”
With the protocells discussed above in mind, let us now 
consider Moffett’s (2013, pp. 239–249) review of the com-
munity-level lifecycles of Pan and recent hunter-gatherers: 
Homo and Pan communities grow as a result of ecological 
success, and they eventually fission into two separate new 
communities if they become too large.2
Moffett notes that this is a much under-researched phe-
nomenon, perhaps due to its relatively long time scale. 
Only two Pan community splits have been observed: a split 
of a bonobo community at Wamba (a side observation by 
Furuichi 1987) and one of a chimpanzee group at Gombe 
(Goodall 1986). In both cases, the process unfolded on a 
decadal time scale, and is only now beginning to be studied 
in detail (using Goodall’s field notes; Feldblum et al. 2018). 
An analysis of the ages of chimpanzee communities suggests 
that the period of these fission events fall in a range between 
several centuries to millennia (Langergraber et al. 2014).
Based on the available evidence, Moffett (2013, 
pp. 240–241) proposes a causal mechanism that he labels 
subgroup coalescence as responsible for effecting a fission 
event. Growth causes social instability as group member-
ship increases (Dunbar 1992, 1993, 1998; Hill and Dunbar 
2003), increasing the likelihood of a split due to a dynamical 
redistribution of the focus of community cohesion (Moody 
and White 2003). At some point in this process of separa-
tion, territorial behavior is triggered, causing the emerging 
compartments to treat each other as social out-groups, which 
completes the division irreversibly. Moffett (2013, p. 240) 
proposes that approximately symmetrical splits are likely to 
be prevalent.
Periodic growth and symmetric division (like a cell) is 
thereby the most probable macroscopic life cycle pattern of 
hominin communities on the face-to-face coordinated level 
throughout human evolution. The societal systems simply 
grew organically, splitting periodically in two.
Just as in the prebiotic protocells, (1) the daughter com-
munities will inherit “packages” of reproducing units whose 
performance (2) affects macrolevel growth, fecundity, and 
mortality, and (3) the “reactants” will be kept together 
socially and by territorial defense.
Community Permeability and Sociont‑Level Inheritance
In the protocell model of the origin of cellular life, a key 
property of the phospholipid vesicle is its impermeability 
to the autocatalytic chemical networks that generate it (see 
above). This is what structures microlevel inheritance into 
macrolevel inheritance on the cellular level, it is what pro-
tects emerging internal adapted organization, and is what 
limits the options for components that undermine coopera-
tion. The social protocell argument is entirely analogous: the 
cultural variants that cause differential community growth 
rates are contained within their communities; see Fig. 2.
We base our argument on an analogy between Pan 
and early hominins, assuming that, on the abstract level 
reflected in the model, early hominin and Pan commu-
nity kinetics were qualitatively similar (Fig. 2). First we 
note that Pan has changed little since the time of diver-
gence from our lineage (see, e.g., Foley and Gamble 2009; 
MacKinnon and Fuentes 2011; Malone et al. 2012; Read 
2012; van Schaik 2016). Second we note that this type of 
2 Fission on this level is irreversible, as opposed to the frequent fis-
sion and fusion events of foraging groups within communities.
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group dynamics appears to largely remain also in our line-
age, in Homo exhibiting a trend of increasing refinement of 
a simpler ancestral theme by the appearance of additional 
levels of social organization (Layton and O’Hara 2010; 
Grove et al. 2012; Layton et al. 2012).
So why do Pan and, presumably, early hominin commu-
nities act as containers? The basic reason is that members 
of the same community interact intensively, persistently, 
and amicably, while members of different communities 
avoid each other or interact agonistically (e.g., Goodall 
1986; Wilson and Wrangham 2003; Boesch et al. 2008; 
Schel et al. 2013). Since culture is transmitted in social 
networks, and since social networks are thereby parti-
tioned at the borders between communities, communities 
partition culture. They contain culture.
We can identify four robust factors that are likely the 
cause of a robust and persistent partitioning:
(1) Close and prolonged contact between role models and 
naïve learners is needed for cultural transmission (as 
with any social learning). Such conditions apply within 
but not between communities (see, e.g., Tostevin 2012).
(2) Enculturated individuals are prevented from moving 
freely between communities (e.g., Nishida et al. 1979; 
Pusey 1979; Wrangham 1979; Wilson and Wrangham 
2003).
(3) Even in the cases when enculturated individuals do 
transfer between communities, isolated individuals are 
poor vectors of cultural traditions due to conformism 
The biological protocell is a 
physical enclosure that, 
hypothetically, formed 
spontaneously from phospholipids 
as by-products from the metabolism 
of autocatalytic chemical networks. 
Its effect was to keep reactants 
together, permitting more “brittle” 
networks, and to cause vertical 
inheritance.
The social protocell is a social
enclosure of hominins and in particular 
their traditions. No special explanation 
is needed. Analogously, it also keeps 
material and traditional “reactants” 
together, verticalizes inheritance, and 
allows complex internal organization.
When the compartmentalized chemical 
networks enjoyed success, autocatalysis 
of new copies of themselves, as well as 
phospholipid by-products would rise. 
This expanded the enclosure and linked 
success on micro- and macrolevels, 
transferring fitness from the bottom on
up.
Ecological success causes 
population growth, which both 
enables and necessitates territorial 
expansion. Fitness on the 
microlevel is thereby similarly 
transferred. 
The growing vesicle becomes 
unstable and fissions spontaneously. 
Two daughter cells divide the 
content of the parent (heredity) and 
may keep growing and dividing, 
generating a population. If growth 
rates are heritable and variable, 
evolution kicks in.
With success, the population grows 
and the social network becomes 
increasingly unstable. Subject to 
chance and contingencies, it 
eventually fissions irreversibly. 
Envisioned effects are analogous to 
those mentioned above. 
Fig. 2  Schematic comparison between social and biological protocell models. We see two systems that could hardly be more different in a mate-
rial sense, but that, nevertheless, exhibit close dynamical and structural similarities of key importance
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(Whiten et al. 2005; van de Waal et al. 2010, 2013; 
Haun et al. 2012; Luncz and Boesch 2014, 2015).
(4) Components of integrated cultural systems are coa-
dapted into larger functional wholes. Their fitness is 
thereby highly context-dependent. This compatibility 
problem must be expected to have gotten worse rather 
than better with increasing cultural complexity.
Lycett et al. (2009) conclude that observed patterns of 
chimpanzee cultural variation are indeed best explained 
by vertical rather than horizontal transmission of culture, 
lending yet another line of evidence; i.e., demic diffusion 
is more prevalent than the diffusion of ideas (Ammerman 
and Cavalli-Sforza 1984), a model that genetic evidence 
also increasingly favors in Holocene sedentary populations 
(Shennan 2013, pp. 302–303).
Although under-researched and challenging to investi-
gate, indirect archaeological evidence based on patterns of 
traces of behavior (Foley and Lahr 2011; Layton et al. 2012; 
Blasco et al. 2013) suggests that community boundaries 
remained a strong barrier to cultural transmission through-
out the evolution of Homo.
The IGUT 
We now turn to the microlevel of the social protocell, and, in 
particular, the variety of socially learned traditional behavior 
that we may assume that it contained. These traditions play a 
central role in our argument as analogues of the autocatalytic 
chemical reactions contained in the protobiotic protocell 
(Fig. 2; see sections above).
A Cultural Tradition That Made a Difference
Extant chimpanzees are widely believed to be qualitatively 
similar to early hominins also with regard to the capacity 
to form and maintain cultural traditions (e.g., Whiten et al. 
2003; McGrew 2010; van Schaik 2016, p. 78). It is therefore 
plausible to assume that early hominins maintained cultural 
traditions at a level and of a type similar to extant wild chim-
panzees (e.g., Boesch and Tomasello 1998; Whiten et al. 
1999, 2003; Boesch 2003; Lycett et al. 2009; Whiten 2011; 
Harmand et al. 2015). That is, a diverse and broad range 
of material and behavioral traditions (see Boesch 2012 for 
overview), potentially long-lived (Mercader et al. 2002, 
2007), with rudimentary cumulative refinement and multi-
component sequential tool use (Boesch 2003, pp. 88–89, 
2012, pp. 66–72; Whiten et al. 2003; Vale et al. 2017). 
Some traditions clearly contribute to ecological success 
(Whiten 2006; Boesch 2012, pp. 47–80) but not in a way 
that approaches the irreplaceable role that culture plays for 
humans.
The tinder—social protocells churning with ever-new var-
iants of chimpanzee-grade cultural traditions—was thereby 
likely in place. What was missing (and remains missing in 
Pan) was the spark: a cultural tradition that would cause the 
community to meet all criteria for evolutionary individuality. 
We conceptualize such a tradition (eventually an integrated 
system of traditions) in terms of three abstract properties it 
must have possessed:
Importance—Possessing the tradition provides a substan-
tial competitive edge.
Generativity—The tradition has room for open-ended 
improvement: variants conveying steadily increasing 
adaptive benefit.
Universality—The tradition would remain important 
across large, contiguous geographical areas. It would not 
be directed at resources or behaviors whose adaptive val-
ues were essentially tied to locally occurring conditions.
Importance means that selection would generate a suf-
ficiently strong selective signal to overcome the vagaries of 
chance. Generativity would ensure that competition would 
not simply stop at an early point beyond which further elabo-
ration of the tradition would not pay. Universality would 
ensure that the tradition (and adaptive variants thereof) actu-
ally could spread beyond its original range, making space 
for a sizeable macrolevel population. We refer to such an 
important, generative, and universal tradition as an IGUT.
The Actual Spark: Cooperative Tool‑Assisted Large Ungulate 
Carnivory
Cooperative large ungulate carnivory provides a well-sup-
ported and plausible candidate IGUT. A likely sequence 
of steps began in scavenging and continued—with deeper 
cooperation and increasingly sophisticated social and techni-
cal behavior—to confrontational scavenging, and finally to 
hunting (e.g., Bunn and Ezzo 1993; Domínguez-Rodrigo and 
Pickering 2003; Fuentes 2017). Tool-assisted and coopera-
tive carnivory emerged by 2.0 mya (Ferraro et al. 2013) but 
likely at least from the beginning of the Oldowan lithic tool 
tradition ca. 2.6 mya (e.g., Semaw 2000; Plummer 2004; 
Domínguez-Rodrigo et al. 2005).
Even small quantities of meat can serve an important 
dietary role by providing essential micronutrients, which for 
example may permit a more efficient overall diet when these 
nutrients do not have to be extracted from large volumes 
of low-quality foods (Tennie et al. 2009). Meat is socially 
and/or technically hard to obtain, but it has high nutritional 
value, and it exists widely in sufficiently large quantities to 
potentially replace most other food sources.
Increasing the intake of meat also dynamically remained 
important as an enabler of brain growth (Aiello and Wheeler 
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1995; Milton 1999, 2003; Snodgrass et al. 2009; Navarrete 
et al. 2011)—and thereby the technical and social intelli-
gence that was critical to the particular way that hominins 
obtained meat. Technical and social intelligence, in turn, 
are widely seen as the two main evolutionary drivers of 
brain enlargement and general intelligence among primates 
(Byrne and Bates 2010). Meat would thereby enable more 
meat.
Large-game carnivory indeed remained the ecological 
focus throughout the evolution of Homo (e.g., Stiner 2002), 
and its generativity as a target of socio-technical adapta-
tion is amply documented across our 2.6 my continuous 
archaeological record of tool production. Efficiency and risk 
reduction could, bit by bit, be achieved traditionally along 
multiple axes, such as mobility, social coordination, weap-
onry, raw material provision, processing, storage, and so on. 
In these areas, we see specialized and compartmentalized 
strategies and artifacts, all organized together into a regula-
tory hierarchy of mutualistic functional wholes. Indeed, we 
see an unbroken genealogy of carnivory leading all the way 
to present-day industrial livestock farming.
Strategies for large ungulate carnivory are also relatively 
easy to readapt to new settings across the world. Large ungu-
lates are present across extensive contiguous tracts of land, 
and their behavior and defenses do not vary drastically.
The first steps may have had similarities with collabora-
tive hunting of colobus monkeys, with frequent food sharing, 
seen in some chimpanzee communities (particularly in the 
Taï forest; see Boesch 2012, p. 90). Although not necessarily 
fully cooperative (van Schaik 2016, pp. 108–109; in the cat-
egories of Boesch and Boesch 1989) these hunts showcase 
how factors (behavior, motivations, and features scaffold-
ing the behavior) can align to produce a protocooperative 
behavior even in species that are not strongly adapted for 
cooperation in general (Tomasello et al. 2012, pp. 674–680). 
Along with extractive foraging (which is the main area of 
chimpanzee subsistence tool use), social hunting is a strong 
candidate precursor of the much more intensive and well-
coordinated cooperation we must imagine in the scavenging, 
hunting, and foraging strategies that we see as a hallmark of 
Homo (van Schaik 2016, p. 101).
Ecological Context of the Sociont I: Large Carcasses
A key difference between the ancestors of Homo and chim-
panzees may simply have been access to large carcasses. 
Beyond the nutritional qualities of meat, these exhibit a 
range of key qualities as targets of a coalescence of mutual-
istic traditions vis-à-vis early Homo, whether as a target of 
scavenging or hunting:
1. Marginal cost of sharing food diminishes as food pack-
age size increases, since a large carcass cannot be con-
sumed quickly, or at all, by a single individual (Blur-
ton Jones 1984; Winterhalder 1996; Stevens and Gilby 
2004). That is, conflict is inherently low, which stimu-
lates cooperation.
2. Cooperation and coordination greatly increases a 
group’s effectiveness in obtaining and monopolizing 
large carcasses (Bickerton 2009; Bickerton and Szat-
mary 2011)—be it by confrontational scavenging or by 
hunting. That is, hominin social cooperation and coor-
dination becomes adaptive.
3. Getting the most out of a large carcass is effectively an 
open-ended exercise in tool-assisted extractive forag-
ing. Carcass processing (and storage, utilization, trans-
port, etc.) demands high technical intelligence: this 
was indeed also the main area of use of early Oldowan 
tools (e.g., Plummer 2004) and remains a central role 
of technology throughout. This means that cooperation 
and coordination between cultural traditions becomes 
adaptive.
Open landscapes are associated with large ungulates, and 
it is widely believed that the dividing line between the Pan 
and hominin lineages was a split in habitat range (e.g., Flea-
gle 2013). The former remained in a closed canopy rainforest 
environment while the latter moved into more varied types 
of landscapes, including lightly forested and open grassland 
(Cerling et al. 2011; Potts 2012, p. 302).
Alignment and Export of Fitness
Let us now return to the technicalities of transitional evolu-
tion during an ETI. Alignment of the initially separate fitness 
interests of cooperating microlevel EI (here, traditions and 
hominins) into a unified macrolevel fitness interest (here, 
the sociont) plays a key role in models of ETI (e.g., Michod 
et al. 2006; Folse and Roughgarden 2010; Niklas and New-
man 2013). As alignment grows stronger, a second process 
termed export of fitness kicks into action. Export of fitness 
entails emerging macrolevel adaptive organization that does 
not belong to the formerly independent components, but that 
emerges “between them,” and that they become increasingly 
dependent on as a source of fitness. In the sociont, this would 
be the emerging cultural socio-technical system, directed at 
large ungulate carnivory.
Alignment may result from a variety of causes. For exam-
ple, the containing properties of the social protocell (see 
above) aligns the fitness of the contained micro-components, 
since it limits their options for avoiding the risks involved 
in cheating (strong “boomerang effect”; see Mesterton-Gib-
bons and Dugatkin 1992). In our model, this provides an 
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initial alignment of fitness that creates a favorable setting for 
cooperation to emerge (between traditions and/or hominins).
The significance of a latent preexisting potential rests 
largely on it removing the perceived necessity that the 
adaptiveness of and the potential for cooperation must be 
explained together, typically as a bottom-up self-reinforcing 
story.
There is a good reason why it seems that explanations 
must look like that. Williams’ (1966) demonstration that 
group-level cooperation is highly sensitive to being under-
mined by individual-level cheaters convinced evolutionary 
theorists not to touch explanations that did not refer to kin 
selection, which, following Hamilton (1964a, b), seemed 
to be the only way that cooperation would not disintegrate 
“from below.”
Subsequent work on cooperation may be described as 
attempts to wiggle out of this “kinship sack”—pushed on 
by the evident ubiquity of cooperation also among nonkin, 
not least among humans. How could Homo become hyper-
cooperative (Nowak and Highfield 2011; Burkart et  al. 
2014) despite a lack of close kinship in groups? The focus 
on cheating is warranted but remains at a level that has been 
described as “obsessive” (Calcott 2011)—not only in the 
context of human evolution but generally.
With kinship not an option, the only remaining option 
has seemed to be that hominin behavior and cognition must 
have set off a self-reinforcing process whereby increasing 
cooperation persistently produced a surplus of fitness align-
ment, which potentiated yet more cooperation. The preferred 
path has been through increasingly sophisticated forms of 
reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Fehr et al. 2002; Nowak 2006).
That cooperation and the potential for cooperation must 
be generated together is, however, a strong constraint on 
permissible explanations—not least on explanations of ori-
gins. While plausible, these bootstrapping explanations are 
not particularly robust. Many stars must be aligned for the 
stories to work, and, in the end, many such stories must 
work together. A more robust source of alignment of fitness 
interests would clearly be preferable—if one existed.
Our social protocell model may provide such a source. 
Like kin selection, it explains why fitness interests between 
cooperators would be aligned at the outset by explaining 
why cheating would not be adaptive in the first place on the 
microlevel.
So the social protocell narrative has it that the fitnesses 
of hominins and their evolving “soup” of traditions were 
initially aligned by the social protocell dynamics (Figs. 1c, 
2), and that this fitness was subsequently exported to adapted 
organization on the emerging sociont level.
Tomasello et al. (2012) developed a compatible model 
that also aims to explain the origins of fitness alignment, 
based on “interdependence kinship” (Roberts 2005). Their 
model focuses on how a network of interdependence 
between hominins could have mimicked the aligning effects 
of genetic kinship. The social protocell depicts a situation 
that would have been ideal for the formation of strong inter-
dependence networks (again, a strong “boomerang effect”). 
From our perspective, interdependence kinship provides 
an example of a mechanism by which integrated adapted 
complexes of traditions (initially the carnivory IGUT, which 
is also the kernel of cooperation that they propose) would 
lead to fitness alignment and vertical export of fitness also 
among hominins (i.e., not only among traditions). Within 
the emerging sociont, hominins would need to rely on each 
other’s ability and propensity to function nominally within 
these shared adapted cultural systems.
The Culture‑First Scenario
Significantly, this potentiates a culture-first scenario where 
cultural traditions may have led the charge in the evolution 
of cooperation to (1) scaffold cooperative and coordinated 
hominin behavior and (2) create selection pressures for 
improved hominin capacities for cooperation and coordina-
tion. The sociont benefited from making us cooperate and 
coordinate, and nothing prevents traditions from modifying 
behavior in that direction.
Cooperation and coordination imposed from the top-
down in this manner is a central concept in ETI. Michod 
and Nedelcu (2003, p. 66), for example, argue that cheat-
ing, in a context of adaptive cooperation, generally intro-
duces selection for “conflict modifiers”—a specific type of 
adaptive organization with exported fitness—in this man-
ner. Their effect is to stabilize cooperation and align fitness 
interests from the top-down—here effectively to impose the 
new “evolutionary will” of the sociont on traditions and 
hominins.
The relevance of such a framework is evident. Many of 
the salient adapted systems that stand out behind the rise of 
Homo are macroscopic and integrate biological, social, and 
technical components. They, moreover, frequently play cen-
tral roles precisely in cooperation and coordination among 
hominins. While their adaptive benefit is straightforward 
once established, their gradual bottom-up origins from 
individual-level and primitive precursors is significantly 
harder to explain.
Examples of “exported” macroscopic cultural systems, 
and their biological support components, include language 
(e.g., Maynard-Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Stout et al. 2008; 
Ardila 2018), exceptional social and technical intelligence 
(e.g., Dunbar 1993; Whiten and van Schaik 2007), moral 
norms (e.g., Tomasello and Vaish 2013), unsolicited proso-
ciality (e.g., Burkart et al. 2014), cultural learning and teach-
ing (Gergely and Csibra 2006; Csibra and Gergely 2009, 
2011; Laland 2017), a variety of “mental modules” (e.g., 
Lotem et al. 2017), executive functions providing function 
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and control (Ardila 2008), a reputation economy and indi-
rect reciprocity (e.g., Nowak 2006), and cheater punishment 
(e.g., Jensen 2010). See also, for example Herrmann et al. 
(2007), Vaesen (2012), and Laland (2017).
From the macroevolutionary sociont perspective, such 
systems (and adaptations to instate and maintain them) 
would not primarily explain cooperation. They would rep-
resent the exploitation of an adaptive potential to realize 
cooperative systems in the fitness-aligned interior of the 
sociont. Driven by an expandable and highly adaptive IGUT, 
a coalescence of traditions into a mutualistically coadapted 
cultural system of traditions can now be plausibly imagined.
Within such systems, collective functions like distribu-
tion, communication, and coordination are plausible—as are 
other supporting functions, such as ones pertaining to the 
transmission and storage of culture and conflict modifica-
tion. These would represent a type of infrastructure of the 
bio-socio-technical sociont, analogous to, for example, the 
vascular, endocrine, immune, or neural systems that we find 
within biological organisms. The adaptive rationale for the 
sociont to promote internal cooperation and coordination is 
that this causes the space of permissible microlevel arrange-
ments to grow, which would open up new swathes of design 
space on the macrolevel.
Organismality and Individuality 
of the Sociont
In our view cooperation would initially have followed some-
thing like the following sequence of phases: (1) Cultural 
traditions becoming coadapted such that their combined 
expression, how they prepare the ground for one another, 
how they stimulate or inhibit the expression of one another, 
and so on, cause them to perform superiorly together. (2) 
Larger and more sophisticated adaptive complexes of such 
cultural traditions taking shape, with (3) “internal” traditions 
arising whose sole fitness contribution comes from serving 
(regulating, coordinating, making more efficient, etc.) other 
traditions, and (4) the formation of modular bio-socio-tech-
nical cultural systems.
Notably, we may imagine this without imagining much 
social coordination and cooperation between hominins at 
all. We may readily imagine, however, how such a system of 
traditions would be more powerful if hominins cooperated 
socially and coordinated their actions—which macroscopic 
sociont organization potentially could make them do since 
culture canalizes behavior and cognition (see above). We 
may furthermore imagine that as the hominins themselves 
became adapted to comfortably serve their roles in these 
systems, that would open up for even more powerful macro-
scopic sociont adaptations to arise—adaptations that again 
stretched the capabilities of the hominins. Eventually, these 
systems would come to seamlessly integrate biological, 
social, and technical components—in some cases, such as 
language, to an extent that culture and nature partly become 
fused.
Although social cooperation well beyond what we 
observe in Pan likely arose early in Homo, the sociont may 
for a long time have remained tightly cohesive and coor-
dinated, yet relatively socially simple compared to recent 
human societies. But in particular, to rightly assess the 
sociont hypothesis we must expand our view of cooperation, 
from pertaining exclusively to social cooperation between 
hominins, to also include cooperation among traditions.
So it may not be the birth of strong cooperation, coordina-
tion, and cohesion per se that we witness in the much more 
recent evolution of Homo sapiens (e.g., Hare 2017), but an 
evolution of sophisticated sociont adaptations to maintain 
a high level of cohesion between more powerful hominin 
components (see also Read 2012), capable of developing and 
maintaining more powerful and flexible bio-socio-technical 
systems. Again, what we witness from this macroevolution-
ary perspective would be a familiar pattern in transitional 
evolution: the emergence of top-down adaptations to expand 
the evolutionary design space on the macrolevel.
Adaptive Functional Organization
Exploring and testing the organismality hypothesis is not a 
realistic aim for this article. Nevertheless, we wish to offer 
a preliminary exploration of the territory, led by those ques-
tions macroevolutionary concepts and models might call for 
us to ask (see, e.g., McShea 2000; Queller and Strassmann 
2009; Folse and Roughgarden 2010).
From a macroevolutionary view, the sociont would have 
utilized heritable cultural information to combine the bio-
logical, social, and technical domains into powerful func-
tional complexes. This holistic bio-socio-technical system is 
what we hypothesize is best viewed as a sociont organism: a 
mutualistic regulatory system of interacting functional parts 
with an entangled biological, social, and material “physi-
ology” (see also e.g., Hodder 2012; Pradhan et al. 2012; 
Whiten and Erdal 2012; Andersson et al. 2014; Laubichler 
and Renn 2015; Stiner and Kuhn 2016; Whiten 2016).
Selection on the sociont level would configure and opti-
mize the sociont-level functionality of this internal system. 
But it must also be expected to have worked to maintain its 
flexibility in at least two senses: (1) cultural evolvability, 
i.e., heritable adaptation, and (2) developmental/behavioral 
flexibility, i.e., flexible and creative cognition- and memory- 
(experience) based recombination of heritable cultural ele-
ments to situations as they arise.
Adapted macroscopic systems—be they social, technical, 
or biological—are hierarchical and modularized: compo-
nents are internally integrated and externally separated such 
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that functionality can be achieved with minimal interference 
among different functional requirements. They are “near-
decomposable” (e.g., Simon 1962; Wimsatt 1975, 1994; 
“near” since integration across the system is needed but 
minimized). Unless they were, they could not have arisen. 
Near-decomposability drastically reduces the dimensional-
ity of design spaces and permits their flexible navigation by 
search processes such as natural selection or creative design. 
Simply put, near-decomposability permits creative processes 
to improve systems one component at a time—or at least 
minimizing the extent to which adjustments must be made 
across subsystems.
The most salient axis of macroscopic modularization and 
hierarchization is that of social units. Modern hunter-gath-
erer social organization represents a highly derived cultural 
form of an ancestral fission–fusion style of organization. 
Several organizational levels—bands, clans, tribes—have 
been added between and above the basic levels of forag-
ing group and community, yielding a hierarchical system 
of adapted organizational levels (Grove et al. 2012; Lay-
ton et al. 2012; Read 2012; Moffett 2013). These represent 
macroscopic adaptive organization: they serve several func-
tions, such as optimizing local group sizes depending on task 
and circumstances, and minimizing mobility requirements 
in areas with low biomass densities (Rolland 2004; Layton 
and O’Hara 2010; Grove et al. 2012; Layton et al. 2012).
Direct evidence of sociont-level bio-socio-technical sys-
tems does not preserve well: social elements do not pre-
serve at all; physical artifacts preserve differentially depend-
ing on material, context, and age; and large-scale physical 
organization is very hard to reconstruct in the general case. 
Evidence of their existence—and a shadow of their general 
outlines—can, however, sometimes be inferred. Some exam-
ples include:
• Transportation and caching of lithic raw material, and 
transport of carcasses to defendable refuges (ca. 2.5–2 
mya; e.g., Blumenschine 1991; Potts 1991; Plummer 
2004; Braun et  al. 2008a, b; Goldman-Neuman and 
Hovers 2012) evidences a nascent macroscopic socio-
technical regime with multiple adapted subcomponents 
that would make sense only together.
• Gesher Benot-Ya’aqov offers a rare glimpse into early 
(ca. 800 kya) societies, revealing a complex economy 
that was differentiated spatially and functionally in an 
even more markedly modular fashion (e.g., Alperson-
Afil et al. 2009). Multiple specialized domains of activ-
ity (e.g., quarrying and woodworking; Goren-Inbar et al. 
1992) imply a high degree of temporal regulation and 
timing of activities.
• Analyses of well-preserved Lower Paleolithic javelins 
(Schöningen, ca. 400 kya) reveal that they were parts 
of a complex, multi-domain organization of activities 
across time and space (Haidle 2009) including networks 
of activities surrounding their production, use, and main-
tenance.
• Late Lower and Early Middle Paleolithic evidence at 
Qesem Cave (400–200 kya; Stiner et al. 2011) shows 
how increasingly ordered social and technical activities 
coalesced around hearths in an institutional role.
We think the sociont emerged and thrived because its 
organizational, hereditary, and developmental mechanisms 
permitted an entirely new way of adapting—one that no 
other type of organism could counter. Apart from quantita-
tive benefits, like speed of adaptation, the sociont would 
not be constrained by having to pack all functionality into 
a single cohesive bodily system. It would have a superior 
potential for separation and thereby independence between 
functional components. We will here refer to this new 
way of adapting to (or indeed hacking) the ecosystem as 
hyper-adaptability.
Hominin Functional Differentiation
Had hominins followed the script inferable from other ETI 
(e.g., Szathmáry 2015, p. 10105), a likely scenario seems to 
be differentiation into functionally complementary castes, 
similar to social insects (Oster and Wilson 1978). But with 
a culturally inherited socio-technical system as a superior 
source of adaptive flexibility, that is not what happened. The 
hominin organism would carry and enable sociont-level cul-
tural adaptation rather than compete with it.
It is therefore unsurprising that hominins embarked on a 
different and wholly unique evolutionary route where dif-
ferentiation and specialization came to be almost entirely 
offloaded to the fast cultural channel of inheritance 
(Lewontin 1972; Foley and Lahr 2011, pp. 1081–1082). We 
should expect to see what we are actually seeing: the homi-
nin as an increasingly powerful, flexible, general-purpose 
“platform” for behavior and cognition that can be turned 
into an exceptionally wide range of specialized forms by 
being “filled with” cultural content via enculturation (e.g., 
Han and Ma 2015; Legare 2017; Sherwood and Gómez-
Robles 2017).
The Baldwin effect provides a likely model of how 
sociont and hominin evolution is linked (Jablonka and Sza-
thmáry 1995; Weber and Depew 2003; Bateson 2004). If the 
sociont continually stretched the cultural capabilities of its 
hominin components, this would exert a consistent selection 
pressure for efficient transmission and use of culture. Those 
that could comfortably serve their roles as parts of this 
machinery would have a competitive advantage. By “catch-
ing up” in this manner, hominin evolution would potentiate 
further sociont evolution, thus renewing the pressure.
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The culturally configurable hominin would be at the core 
of the immense and flexible design space of the sociont bio-
socio-technical system. For example, with adaptations for 
coordination, cooperation, and cultural storage and trans-
mission (e.g., language and a natural pedagogy; see Gergely 
and Csibra 2006; Csibra and Gergely 2009, 2011; Legare 
2017; several other cognitive and psychological adaptations 
to such a role were mentioned in the “Alignment and Export 
of Fitness” section). This is the proposed nature and role of 
hominins as components of the sociont.
The Hominin and its Brain in the Hyper‑Adaptable 
Sociont
In turn, the arguably most enigmatic part of Homo is its 
brain. Encephalization quotients in Homo grew in the period 
that we propose the ETI took place (ca. 2.5–1.8 mya) to 
exceed those of Pan and Australopithecus decisively (Falk 
et al. 2000; Williams 2002; Roth and Dicke 2005). During 
the further evolution of Homo, relative brain size continued 
to increase steadily to modern levels (e.g., Rightmire 2004). 
From our perspective, this indicates that the hominin brain 
was now “mounted” in an adaptive machinery that could 
not only make better use of the brain but also better shield 
it from the risks that it incurred (e.g., Han and Ma 2015; 
Sherwood and Gómez-Robles 2017; Sterelny 2017).
We propose that the sociont organism could leverage 
intelligence into much larger adaptive benefits than could 
an individual ape organism. Break-even between the ben-
efits, costs (Aiello and Wheeler 1995; Leonard et al. 2003; 
Snodgrass et al. 2009; Herculano-Houzel 2012), and risks 
(e.g., altriciality, obstetric dilemma; Dunsworth et al. 2012) 
of having a large brain thereby occurred at ever-larger brain 
sizes as the sociont’s bio-socio-technical design space was 
evolutionarily explored and expanded over time. The homi-
nin brain was furthermore buffered from risks by a homeo-
static regulatory host that maintained conditions within 
increasingly narrow ranges.
The Ecological Context of the Sociont II: Variability 
Selection
Adaptability to environmental variability was already highly 
developed in early hominins, as in great apes generally 
(Ungar et al. 2006; Boesch 2012, pp. 47–80; Malone et al. 
2012; see also Rendell et al. 2011). We see the evolution of 
hyper-adaptability as a continuation, by new means, along 
that same trajectory: a capacity to adapt to variability by 
creativity and resourcefulness (see also Fuentes 2017; Foga-
rty et al. 2015).
The emerging picture of the ecological context of the ETI 
is that the period between ca. 3.0–2.0 mya combined three 
patterns that are associated with the onset of the Pleistocene 
ice age: (1) general climatic cooling and spread of open 
landscapes with high concentration and large packages of 
biomass (Vrba 1988, 1995; deMenocal 1995); see also the 
“Ecological Context of the Sociont I: Large Carcasses” sec-
tion; (2) high climatic variability (Potts 1998a, 2012; Maslin 
and Christensen 2007; Potts and Faith 2015); (3) a pulsed 
distribution of this variability (Shultz and Maslin 2013; 
Maslin et al. 2014, 2015).
Hyper-adaptability fits well into the image of the “vari-
ability selection hypothesis” (Potts 1998b, 2012; Grove 
2011a, b; Maslin et al. 2014, 2015) in the sense that hyper-
adaptability would be particularly adaptive in a context of 
high environmental variability. Territorial hominins, unable 
to migrate freely when faced with sudden and radical local 
biotope and faunal turnover (Leakey and Werdelin 2010, 
pp. 7–8; Maslin et al. 2015), would benefit greatly from the 
ability to drastically reconfigure their strategies locally.
The period of environmental variability and high homi-
nin diversity in Southern and East Africa (e.g., Antón et al. 
2014; Maslin et al. 2015; Carotenuto et al. 2016) was fol-
lowed by a dramatic range expansion across the Old World 
(Fleagle et al. 2010; Antón et al. 2014; Foley 2016) We 
think hyper-adaptability, driven by variability selection, also 
poised the sociont for adapting to geographical variability, 
and thereby a unique expansion into an entirely new and 
broad range of biotopes.
Evolutionary Individuality
To qualify as an EI the sociont must not only be sufficiently 
cohesive to align the fitnesses of its components. It must 
also meet some basic criteria pertaining to how it behaves 
as a population (Lewontin 1970; Godfrey-Smith 2007). We 
conclude that Homo communities as socionts may plausibly 
have done so:
• Cultural phenotypic variation exists between extant 
chimpanzee communities (Whiten et al. 2001; Lycett 
et al. 2009; Boesch 2012; Luncz and Boesch 2014, 2015). 
Cultural elements of different Homo communities cer-
tainly vary, as do their manifestations as holistic adapted 
systems.
• Cultural differences may cause at least slight differential 
fitness in chimpanzees (Boesch 2012, pp. 47–80; Whiten 
2006), and they straightforwardly do in Homo.
• Traditions can be highly persistent among chimpanzees 
(Mercader et al. 2002, 2007) and may be assumed to 
have been also among pre-ETI early hominins. Many 
Homo cultural components are exceptionally persistent 
and widespread—not least basic lithic designs. As chim-
panzee traditions are heritable and may confer fitness, we 
feel confident stating that cultural fitness is heritable.
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Discussion
We began by arguing the need for new “meta-narratives” 
and claiming that some variant of our hypothesis poten-
tially may provide one. Meta-narratives—narratives about 
narratives—in the context of scientific theory mean, essen-
tially, some general set of theoretical principles that scaf-
folds the construction of explanations and new ideas. It 
structures the theoretical and empirical search space and 
helps maintain a measure of unity so that derivative expla-
nations support rather than contradict one another. In the 
case of historical sciences, the lack of a meta-narrative 
means that history tends to look like “one damned thing 
after another”—as Henry Ford reputedly put it.
A meta-narrative is not sufficient in itself, however: it 
is too abstract to “reach” all the way down to the empiri-
cal level. It must be evaluated through the performance of 
more specialized theoretical embodiments that extend the 
meta-narrative while remaining consistent with it—mod-
els, theory, and arguments about specific phenomena.
The macroevolutionary theoretical search for theory to 
explain the big patterns in natural history and the phylog-
eny of life is precisely a search for models to go between 
foundational Darwinian meta-narrative and the empirical 
background. A long-standing mystery that neo-Darwinian 
evolutionary theory says very little about is how major 
evolutionary transitions have taken place (e.g., Maynard-
Smith and Szathmáry 1995; Gould 2002; Szathmáry 
2015). How did evolution go from bacteria to protists? 
From unicellular protists to multicellular organisms? From 
multicellular organisms to human civilizations?
Such bouts of transitional evolution call for meta-
evolutionary theory that explains how these Darwinian 
principles—embodied in one set of adapted systems—can 
periodically give rise to sets of new such embodiments and 
radically new regimes of adapted organization. As we have 
discussed, a series of evolutionary pathways that explain 
how such transitions are possible within the constraints 
of the overarching Darwinian meta-narrative have been 
identified.
What we do is to adapt and combine insights about 
such pathways to address the human MET—arguably the 
most dramatic and inherently interesting one of them all. 
If human evolution kicked off as something that has recog-
nizable precedents in natural history—which the proposed 
model hypothesizes was the case—then we would be in a 
much better shape to understand human evolution.
First, human evolution would be better unified with 
our overall evolutionary understanding of natural history. 
That would bode well for future theoretical development. 
Second, we would have something to begin construct-
ing theory from—something that produces quite specific 
predictions about what patterns we should and should not 
expect to see in human evolution.
Our aim with this article has been to argue for plausi-
bility and likelihood to a level where the proposition may 
be viewed as worthy of further inquiry, which will entail 
going deeper into literature that we have only sampled 
here. The first task ought to be to consider the existing 
but disparate wealth of causally important factors that 
have been proposed based on close consideration of the 
expanding empirical field (such as those reviewed by Mas-
lin et al. (2015), as they called for new meta-narratives). 
Is our proposition consistent with such models, and does 
it stimulate a unification among such models?
Furthermore, it remains to be explored how our proposi-
tion interacts with other proposed meta-level frameworks. 
For example, niche construction theory (NCT; e.g., Laland 
and Brown 2006; Smith 2007; Laland and O’Brien 2015), 
dual-inheritance theory (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feld-
man 1981; Boyd and Richerson 1985; Whiten et al. 2011), 
models of bottom-up evolution of stable reciprocal coop-
eration (e.g., Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; van Schaik and 
Kappeler 2006; Tomasello 2008; MacKinnon and Fuentes 
2011; Nowak and Highfield 2011; Tomasello et al. 2012; 
Wilson 2012; Burkart et al. 2014), and models emphasiz-
ing the role of organization, regulation, and development 
in cultural evolution (e.g., MacKinnon and Fuentes 2011; 
Wimsatt 2013; Andersson et al. 2014; Fuentes 2015, 2016; 
Stiner and Kuhn 2016).
We have furthermore identified a number of domains 
in terms of the ontology of the proposed model where fur-
ther work to organize and interpret existing evidence will 
put the hypothesis to the test and permit its elaboration. 
We have the ETI itself (see “The Hominin ETI” section), 
which bears on the kinetics of community life cycles and 
their primate and human social underpinning. We also 
have the functional organization of Homo communities 
(see the “Organismality and Individuality of the Sociont” 
section) and the evolution of Homo itself, where we hint at 
a mutualistic evolutionary pathway where Homo actually 
turns into a component of the sociont. Homo would, for 
many functional purposes, have become enclosed within 
the sociont, which may suggest that endosymbiosis could 
be a fruitful model for understanding human evolution, 
and possibly also domestication. Finally, we have macro-
scopic historical and geographical evolutionary patterns, 
which we have not gone into at all in this article.
Since we are invoking MET models that are extensively 
worked out in their original settings, quite specific predic-
tions may be developed, and the potential for finding strong 
tests is thereby promising. In other words, our hypothesis 
constrains what sorts of patterns it is compatible with quite 
strongly. We may thereby expect to be able to tell whether 
this is actually a workable meta-narrative or not.
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The only other theoretical framework approaching this 
scope would be NCT—and it also predicts a structured and 
organized “layer” between what we traditionally think is the 
lead character of the story (i.e., the hominin organism) and 
the backdrop (the ecological and environmental exterior). 
NCT does appear considerably less theoretically constrain-
ing than the sociont model as a meta-narrative; i.e., it is 
more unclear what critical tests would tell us that we are not 
looking at niche construction, or, for that matter, that would 
point uniquely to niche construction.
That said, the sociont is by no means incompatible 
with NCT. To the contrary, even if the bio-socio-technical 
“innards” of the sociont arose top-down through internal 
adaptive organization (ETI), there are potentially interest-
ing points of connection between ETI and niche construc-
tion (e.g., Torday 2016). Moreover, the sociont itself is a 
potential niche constructor on its level, as it interfaces with, 
and modifies, the environment (see also Fuentes 2016)—
inserting itself, as it were, between the hominin and the 
constructed niche. Its main novel adaptive capacity—which 
we describe as hyper-adaptability (see above)—may easily 
be seen as a capacity that vastly expands the potential for, 
precisely, constructing niches.
Moving forward also entails something that is easy to 
forget: evolutionary hypotheses make statements about out-
comes of historical dynamics. We are exceptionally poor at 
seeing through emergence and nonlinear dynamics, and so 
models must be designed to verify that the hypothesis really 
predicts what is being argued and tested. Models, moreover, 
permit us to explore theoretical systems by varying them, 
and they permit us to discover patterns and phenomena that 
we never could have guessed were entailed by the theory. 
Simulating hominin/Pan communities on the behavioral 
microlevel to reproduce their lifecycles may be a first step, 
to be followed by adding cultural transmission to simulate 
the predicted vertical channeling and its outcomes. The ETI 
may be similarly explored as may the evolution of simulated 
hominins reproducing in this system.
We agree fully with Foley’s (2016) view that human 
evolution has a great potential to push the boundaries of 
evolutionary theory. In many ways we are looking at a phe-
nomenon that, compared with the rest of natural history, is 
as exotic as any extraterrestrial type of life could be, and we 
have it right before us in increasingly fine detail.
From the perspective of anthropology, the proposed 
model may help to reduce friction between evolutionary and 
social approaches (Fuentes 2016) by addressing in a funda-
mental way how an evolutionary view may interface with 
the immensely complex, integrated, and rich organization 
of hominin societies. An improved understanding of what 
would be a correct ontology for understanding how humans, 
our societies, and nature are related would indeed have very 
far-reaching consequences.
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